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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Brecht v.
Abrahamson,' clarified by the 1995 decision in O'Neal v.
McAninch,2 represents an important extension of the Court's
recent work in restructuring the federal habeas corpus remedy
against the backdrop of recurring congressional debate over the
limitation of federal review for state inmates.3 In Brecht, the
Court imposed for the first time a prejudice requirement for
state inmates litigating federal constitutional claims in federal
habeas cases. The Court departed from the traditional harmless-
error standard for reviewing constitutional error,4 which re-
quired reversal in state proceedings unless a federal constitu-
tional error was considered harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.5 Rather, the Brecht majority concluded that claims in-
1. 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993). For a thorough and scholarly evaluation of Brecht in
light of the Court's general approach to harmlessness and prejudice analysis, see John
H. Blume & Steven P. Garvey, Harmless Error in Federal Habeas Corpus after Brecht
v. Abrahamson, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 163 (1994). The decision has also been ana-
lyzed in a number of casenotes. See James A. Carey, Jr., Note, 24 SETON HALL L.
REv. 1636 (1994); Patrick Ickes, Note, Brecht v. Abrahamson: A New Federal Stan-
dard of Habeas Review, 20 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 319 (1993); Lisa S. Spickler, Note,
Brecht v. Abrahamson: Another Step Toward Evisceration of Habeas Corpus, 27 U.
RICH. L. REv. 549 (1993). A particular caustic assessment is presented by Jason S.
Marks, Postscript: Harmless Error, Habeas Corpus, and a Constitutional Eclipse, 8
CRIM. JUST. No. 3, 30 (1993).
2. 115 S. Ct. 992 (1995).
3. For a thorough critique of the Court's overall approach to federal habeas re-
view of state court convictions, see Daniel B. Yeager, Categorical and Individualized
Rights-Ordering on Federal Habeas Corpus, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 669 (1994).
The author engages in an analysis of the Court's concern for "accuracy" in the fact-
finding process as an element for application of differing standards of review to state
court constitutional error and the fragmented underpinnings of habeas jurisprudence
which has emerged.
4. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
5. Id. at 24. Justice Breyer, writing for the majority in O'Neal, reminded readers
that Chapman was consistent with "'the original common-law harmless-error rule
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volving "trial error" require relief only if the error "had sub-
stantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
jury's verdict."6
In a series of significant decisions over the past decade, the
Court has limited access to federal remedies based on proce-
dural failures in the litigation process. Most notably, in
Coleman v. Thompson,7 the Court recognized state procedural
default of federal constitutional claims as barring subsequent
habeas review on their merits, with only very narrowly inter-
preted exceptions to the general rule.' The Court's approach
has essentially restricted state prisoners to litigation of constitu-
tional claims in a single federal habeas action,9 recognizing
only quite limited exceptions to this general policy."°
[which] put the burden on the beneficiary of the error [here, as Justice Breyer notes,
the State] . . . to prove that there was no injury."' O'Neal, 115 S. Ct. at 995 (quoting
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24); see also 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 21 (3d ed. 1940).
6. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1714 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,
776 (1946)). "The Kotteakos harmless-error standard is better tailored to the nature and
purpose of collateral review than the Chapman standard .... " Id.
7. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
8. Id. at 729-31. The exceptions to application of state procedural default as a bar
to relitigation of federal constitutional claims in federal habeas corpus include applica-
tion of the "cause and prejudice" test of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977).
Cause and prejudice may be demonstrated by a claim of constitutionally ineffective
assistance of counsel, Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, but the Coleman Court expressly
concluded that ineffectiveness in the context of state post-conviction representation did
not implicate the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance. Consequently,
Coleman's state post-conviction counsel's defective performance in missing the date
for filing a necessary appeal in his state writ barred consideration of his federal claims
in federal habeas corpus. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752. The other exception to the appli-
cation of the procedural bar rule arises when the conviction of an innocent person is
demonstrated, raising a question of manifest injustice in the state prosecution. Murray
v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986).
9. E.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (dismissing successor petition
absent showing of cause and prejudice in failing to raise claim in initial application);
Delo v. Stokes, 495 U.S. 320 (1990) (granting successive habeas petition only upon
showing of substantial grounds upon which relief can be granted, typically not when
claims could have been raised in prior petition); Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377
(1984) (vacating stay granted where petition asserted claims which could have been as-
serted in prior petition); Wainwright v. Sikes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (requiring petitioner
seeking to assert claim in successor habeas petition to demonstrate cause and prejudice
resulting from factor external to his representation, such as interference by state offi-
cials, precluding litigation of claim in prior proceeding).
10. State inmates may bring successive federal habeas petitions only upon a show-
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In contrast to its concern for procedural regularity in federal
habeas litigation, in Brecht and O'Neal the Court addressed the
substantive problem of prejudice resulting from constitutional
violations, rather than focusing on procedural limitations im-
posed upon inmates seeking federal relief from their state court
convictions.1' Brecht and O'Neal dealt with the circumstances
in which an inmate may demonstate a substantive claim to
federal relief from his state court conviction.
12
These decisions signal a shift in the federal habeas
petitioner's burden of demonstrating a right to relief in a sig-
nificant class of federal claims raised by state inmates in feder-
al habeas proceedings' 3-those relating to error committed
during the course of trial. 4 The test for relief has been funda-
mentally altered as a result of the Court's work in Brecht and
O'Neal. The Court now recognizes a "standard" or "burden"
of proof of some degree of prejudice for federal habeas claim-
ants asserting trial error in their state trials.
ing (1) that their claims of federal violations demonstrate prejudice based on their actu-
al innocence of the crimes for which they have been convicted, Kuhlmann v. Wilson,
477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) and Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2518-19 (1992)
(finding that actual innocence claim in context of capital prosecution would address
issue upon which defendant's lack of culpability would preclude imposition of death
sentence) or (2) that the inmate's ability to raise the federal claim in the initial habeas
petition resulted from some cause external to or beyond his control, such as prosecuto-
rial misconduct, McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
11. For instance, the Court's 1993 decision in Herrera v. Collins, focused on cog-
nizance of a claim of actual innocence advanced by a state inmate not supporting a
claim of constitutional rights violation. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993), aff'g
954 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting Texas death row inmate's claim that exculpa-
tory evidence established his actual innocence of capital crime, asserted in successive
federal habeas petition without substantial claim that government had effectively sup-
pressed exculpatory evidence).
12. See, e.g., Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942) (finding that federal
habeas relief was available to state inmates to address claims based on "disregard of
the constitutional rights of the accused, and where the writ is the only effective means
of preserving his rights").
13. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988). The statute affords state inmates a federal forum for
litigating claims of federal constitutional rights violations occurring in the course of
state criminal trials.
14. Trial error has been defined by the Supreme Court as error occurring during
the course of the actual trial, including the presentation of evidence, argument, and jury
deliberations. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-07 (1990).
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II. THE SETTING FOR THE COURT'S NEW RULE OF PREJUDICE
Brecht arose in the context of a factually bizarre murder
prosecution. Brecht had been released from a Georgia prison
into the custody of his sister and her husband, who happened
to be a local district attorney in Wisconsin. When his brother-
in-law returned home to find that Brecht had violated the terms
of his in-house probation by drinking and firing a rifle in the
backyard of the home, Brecht shot and killed him. 5 After a
temporary escape and flight to Minnesota, which included at
least two encounters with police during which Brecht neither
admitted the killing nor explained its circumstances, he was
caught and returned to Wisconsin for trial. Brecht was given
his Miranda6 warnings at arraignment. 7
At trial, Brecht claimed that the shooting had been acciden-
tal and that he had panicked and fled when he realized his
brother-in-law had been shot. 8 The prosecution argued that
Brecht had given inconsistent and false stories to police who
investigated the accident and that he had failed to tell the offi-
cer investigating the accident or the officers who arrested him
that the shooting had been an accident. 9 Over defense objec-
tion, the prosecution also asked the petitioner on cross-exami-
nation if he had ever told anyone prior to trial that the shoot-
ing had been an accident. After Brecht responded that he had
not wished to waive his rights at that time,2" the prosecutor
argued his pre-arrest silence during closing argument.2
The Wisconsin appellate courts differed on the use of
Brecht's pre-arrest silence. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals
held22 that this comment on silence violated due process under
15. 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1714 (1993).
16. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda warnings inform a person
that he has the right to remain silent and assure him, at least implicitly, that his subse-
quent decision to remain silent cannot be used against him. Id. at 467-68.
17. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1714.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1714-15.
20. Id. at 1715 n.2.
21. Id.
22. State v. Brecht, 405 N.W.2d 718, 723 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd, 421
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Doyle v. Ohio.23 The Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed that a
Doyle violation had occurred, but held that the error was harm-
less beyond a reasonable doube in compliance with the stan-
dard for review enunciated by the United States Supreme Court
in Chapman.2"
Brecht then sought federal habeas relief based on the
claimed Doyle violation.2 6 The district court set aside the con-
viction, finding that the use of Brecht's post-arrest silence vio-
lated Doyle. The district court disagreed with the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's conclusion that the error could be deemed
harmless on the record.27
The case was again reversed, this time by the Seventh Cir-
cuit, which concluded that a Doyle error had occurred, but
fashioned a different rule for determining whether the error
occurred.28 The Seventh Circuit concluded that the Doyle vio-
lation involved a violation of a "prophylactic rule" designed to
implement constitutional protections, rather than a fundamental
right.29 In distinguishing the nature of the violation, the court
of appeals concluded that the Chapman harmless-error standard
would not apply to review of this type of violation.30 Instead,
the court of appeals applied a prejudice standard previously
N.W.2d 96 (Wis. 1988), habeas corpus granted sub nom. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 759
F. Supp. 500 (W.D. Wis.), rev'd, 944 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1991), affd, 113 S. Ct. 1710
(1993).
23. 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (holding reference to accused's silence upon being given
Miranda warnings at time of arrest violates due process in punishing accused for rely-
ing on right to remain silent). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals referred to Reichhoff
v. State, 251 N.W.2d 470, 473 (Wis. 1977), which cited Doyle as authority for its
holding regarding the improper use of custodial silence in federal criminal prosecution.
Brecht, 405 N.W.2d at 722.
24. State v. Brecht, 421 N.W.2d 96, 104 (Wis. 1988), habeas corpus granted sub
nom. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 759 F. Supp. 500 (W.D. Wis. 1991), rev'd, 944 F.2d 1363
(7th Cir. 1991), affd, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
25. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
26. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 759 F. Supp. 500 (W.D. Wis.), rev'd, 944 F.2d 1363
(7th Cir. 1991), affid, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
27. Id. at 508.
28. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 1710
(1993).
29. Id. at 1370.
30. Id. at 1374-75.
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formulated for review of claims of error in federal proceedings.
This standard was articulated in Kotteakos v. United States.3
The Kotteakos Court required a showing that error prejudiced
the accused's right to a fair trial before relief should be afford-
ed on a federal habeas petitioner's claim challenging a state
court conviction.32 The court of appeals reversed the grant of
relief, finding that the error did not result in the prejudice
required for reversal of Brecht's state conviction for murder.33
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Seventh
Circuit and approved its application of the Kotteakos rule for
disposition of claims of constitutional trial error on federal
habeas review of state convictions.34 However, the Brecht ma-
jority did not adopt the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit with
respect to its characterization of the error as involving a viola-
tion of a prophylactic rule.35 The majority rejected the Seventh
Circuit's characterization of Doyle error as "a prophylactic rule
designed to protect another prophylactic rule [Miranda] from
erosion or misuse."36 According to the majority, Doyle stands
31. 328 U.S. 750 (1946); see also United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449
(1986).
32. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776. The standard requires consideration of whether the
constitutional violation "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
the jury's verdict." Id.
33. Brecht, 944 F.2d at 1376.
34. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722-23. The Court concluded that the "Doyle error
which occurred at petitioner's trial did not 'substantially influence' the jury's verdict."
Id.
35. The Court's treatment of the interplay of Miranda and the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination may appear inconsistent. For instance, in Michigan
v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974), Justice Rehnquist observed that the conduct of
the police complained of "did not abridge respondent's constitutional privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, but departed only from the prophylactic standards later
laid down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege." The issue in Tucker
involved a pre-Miranda failure of police to advise a suspect of his right to assistance
of counsel prior to interrogating him. Id. at 933. Justice Powell later observed that
Tucker had apparently involved no infringement on constitutional rights because the
police interrogation was not tainted by compulsion, but only by departure from the
subsequently imposed Miranda standards. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985)
(Powell, J., concurring). If violations of Miranda truly implicate only "departures"
from its prophylactic requirements, the Seventh Circuit's limited application of
Kotteakos to violations involving prophylactic safeguards appears sound.
36. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1717 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363,
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for the proposition that a prosecution's use of post-Miranda si-
lence violates due process," and Doyle error consequently in-
volves "trial error," rather than violation of a mere prophylactic
rule."
The Court's rejection of the "prophylactic rule" analysis
advanced by the Seventh Circuit was consistent with its treat-
ment of Miranda claims in another important context during
the same term. In Withrow v. Williams,39 the majority rejected
the distinction previously urged by Justice O'Connor in
Duckworth v. Eagan.4" In Duckworth, Justice O'Connor rea-
soned in her concurrence that Miranda-based claims should be
treated similarly to Fourth Amendment issues for purposes of
federal habeas corpus and should not be heard by federal
courts if the petitioner had previously been afforded a full and
fair hearing on the suppression claims in state courts.41 In-
stead, the Withrow majority retained federal habeas jurisdiction
over claims of Miranda violations allegedly committed by state
authorities.42
Consequently, the Brecht majority's adoption of the
Kotteakos rule reaches far beyond the limited effect which
would have been given to the Seventh Circuit's application of
the rule. Rather than being limited to violations of prophylactic
1370 (7th rC' 1OO1l\
37. Id.
38. Id. The majority relied on the characterization of trial error as that which oc-
curs during the "presentation of the case to the jury." Id. (quoting Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 27.9, 307 (1991)).
39. 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993).
40. 492 U.S. 195, 205 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia joined in
the O'Connor concurrence.
41. Id. The Court held in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 (1976), that
claimed violations of a state criminal defendant's Fourth Amendment rights to be free
from unlawful searches and seizures would no longer be cognizable in federal habeas
corpus if the petitioner had been afforded a full and fair hearing on these claims in the
state court proceedings.
42. Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1753-54. Justice O'Connor, consistent with her position
in Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989), authored an opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part, joined by the Chief Justice. Justice Scalia, who had joined her
opinion in the earlier case, wrote a separate opinion, concurring and dissenting, joined
by Justice Thomas. Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1765 (Scalia, J., concurring & dissenting).
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rules, the majority's approach permits the rule to supplant the
traditional harmless-error analysis of Chapman in resolution of
all constitutional claims arising during the course of trial it-
self.43
A. The Nature of the Constitutional Violation Considered in
Brecht
The Seventh Circuit concluded that Brecht's conviction
should not be set aside because the error resulting from the
Doyle error involved only a violation of the prophylactic
rule" of Miranda v. Arizona.45 While agreeing that a Doyle
error had been committed, the Seventh Circuit nevertheless
concluded that relief should be granted only if the error "'had
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
jury's verdict."'46 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
Brecht majority, rejected the distinction between violation of
fundamental rights and the prophylactic rule of Miranda drawn
by the Seventh Circuit and instead held that Doyle error consti-
tutes a violation of due process." In so holding, the majority
expressly concluded that "due process is violated whenever the
prosecution uses for impeachment purposes a defendant's post-
Miranda silence. Doyle thus does not bear the hallmarks of a
43. According to the Brecht Court, trial error is that which "occur[s] during the
presentation of the case to the jury." Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1717. The Court relied on its
prior decision in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307 (1991), for this formulation
of "trial error." Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1717.
44. Brecht, 944 F.2d at 1370.
45. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
46. Brecht, 944 F.2d at 1375 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,
776 (1946)).
47. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1717. Justice O'Connor's dissent expressly notes the sig-
nificance of prophylactic rules in the truth-finding calculation which she believes
should govern availability of federal habeas review. Id at 1728-29 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). In Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1756-65 (1993), Justice O'Connor
dissented from a majority holding refusing to extend the principle of limitation on
federal habeas review first recognized to apply to Fourth Amendment claims in Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), to Miranda violations, arguing that these claims repre-
sented violations of a prophylactic rule which effectively impedes the truthseeking
function of criminal trials.
1995
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prophylactic rule."4
The majority's approach permitted the Court to effectively
reinforce the significance of the guarantee of silence as an al-
ternative for a criminal suspect and facilitated the imposition of
the rule, which had been applied in limited fashion by the Sev-
enth Circuit, for the resolution of all claims of constitutional
trial error. Yet, the majority did not conclude that the right to
avoid negative inferences from silence is absolute: it held that
Brecht's pre-Miranda silence was properly admitted to impeach
his trial testimony that the killing had been accidental.4
B. Rejection of Characterization of Miranda as
"Prophylactic "
The Court's characterization of the error in Doyle as funda-
mental, rather than a violation of a prophylactic rule, does
present one problem. If the error represents a violation of the
accused's fundamental right to remain silent, why does that
violation occur only when the accused has been advised of his
or her Miranda rights? In Jenkins v. Anderson" and Fletcher
v. Weir"' the Court held that pre-arrest silence and post-arrest,
pre-Miranda silence remained admissible to impeach trial testi-
mony. The reasoning in both cases rested on the assumption
that absent formal custodial intervention and the giving of the
required warnings, an accused's silence could not be inferred to
flow from a reliance on his constitutional right to remain si-
lent. 2 Thus, the probative value of silence, which forms the
48. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1717.
49. Id. at 1716-19 ("It was entirely proper-and probative-for the State to im-
peach his testimony by pointing out that petitioner had failed to tell anyone before the
time he received his Miranda warnings at his arraignment about the shooting being an
accident.").
50. 447 U.S. 231, 239 (1980) (holding that the use of pre-arrest silence to impeach
a defendant's credibility does not deny him the fundamental fairness guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment).
51. 455 U.S. 603, 606-07 (1982) (holding that in the absence of the affirmative as-
surances embodied in the Miranda warnings, states do not violate due process by al-
lowing cross-examination about post-arrest silence).
52. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238-40; Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 603-06.
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basis for its use in impeachment, would remain undisturbed
even by a presumption that the suspect was aware of his con-
stitutional rights at the time he elected not to offer an explana-
tion.
There can be no doubt that silence may be highly probative
when a subsequent explanation offered at trial would suggest
that the same explanation could have been appropriately offered
to investigating officers or other witnesses prior to trial. Even
assuming reliance on the Fifth Amendment privilege, silence in
lieu of a reasonable explanation might still prove probative for
a fact-finder assessing the credibility of an explanation ad-
vanced for the first time at trial.
Yet, Doyle and its federal companion, United States v.
Hale," do not permit the use of silence for impeachment
where the suspect might well have elected not to advance the
explanation in his exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege.
Brecht clearly respects the Doyle principle in this regard, yet
does not answer either of two questions posed by the disparate
application of the principle to pre-Miranda and post-Miranda
silence. First, why not presume that an accused knows and
understands his right to remain silent in the absence of
Miranda warnings? If this presumption was made, one could
not assume that his pre-Miranda silence reflects a fabrication
of the trial testimony rather than a generalized reliance on the
right not to have to offer an explanation. Second, if the protec-
tion is effectively triggered by the giving of the Miranda warn-
ing, why was the Seventh Circuit in error in concluding that
Doyle merely reflected a prophylactic rule enforcing the pro-
phylactic intent of Miranda? Neither question is adequately
addressed by the opinion in Brecht.
In fact, according to the holding, "due process" is offended
only when the accused has been read his Miranda rights, and
his post-warning silence is used by the prosecution.54 The
Brecht majority's framing of the issue seems inherently to im-
plicate the prophylactic nature of Miranda warnings as part and
53. 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
54. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1717.
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parcel of the Fifth Amendment protection. Otherwise, pre-
Miranda silence would be equally unavailable to the prosecu-
tion as violative of the privilege because the suspect would be
presumed to understand his right to remain silent. In holding
that only post-Miranda silence is protected, the substantive
right is clearly made contingent on the prophylactic rule; i.e.,
"You have a right to remain silent once we tell you that you
do."
The Brecht majority could have extended Kotteakos to all
claims of constitutional trial error raised by state inmates in
federal habeas actions without rejecting the Seventh Circuit's
distinction between violations of fundamental rights and viola-
tions of prophylactic rules designed to protect fundamental
rights. Instead, the Court, without explaining why the protection
afforded by the Fifth Amendment remains contingent on the
giving of Miranda warnings, supplied an alternative explanation
which superficially enhances the value of the privilege rather
than extending the privilege to all post-transaction silence on
the part of a suspect."
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ALLOCATION OF THE
"BURDEN" OF PROOF
In requiring the habeas petitioner to establish that trial error
has "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in deter-
mining the jury's verdict," the Brecht Court clearly broke with
tradition, holding that violations of federally protected rights do
not have to be shown to be harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt in order to avoid reversal. 6 As the majority noted, ap-
plication of the Chapman harmless-error rule on direct appeal
places the burden on the State to demonstrate that the error
55. Factually, of course, Brecht was further distinguishable because the accused
did not remain totally silent in his pre-arrest dealings with police; instead he offered a
fabricated explanation for the accident involving his sister's car which occurred while
he was in flight from the homicide. While silence is certainly protected by the Fifth
Amendment, a prior explanation inconsistent with trial testimony would not be subject
to the privilege and should always be available for impeachment of the trial testimony.
56. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1721-22 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.
750, 776 (1946)).
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committed at trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."
The significance of the change in the burden of proof is
highlighted by the concurring opinion in Brecht authored by
Justice Stevens." He argued that the different standards of
review represented by Chapman and Kotteakos actually repre-
sented a less dramatic variance than might be at first
thought.5 9 For Justice Stevens, "the way we phrase the govern-
ing standard is far less important than the quality of the judg-
ment with which it is applied."6
The Stevens' posture is particularly critical because his was
the fifth vote in the narrow Brecht majority. Moreover, his as-
sessment is subject to a very practical critique. Appellate deci-
sionmaking, including that in which a district or magistrate
judge engages in considering the state trial record alleged to
support a claimed violation, varies according to the quality of
the judge involved in the determination and her skill and com-
mitment to the process. The least "judicious" of reviewing
judges are most likely to reach results oriented to their percep-
tions of the merits of the claim based upon their reaction to
the accused, the offense, or the work or reputation of counsel.
For these judges, the question of standard of review or burden
of proof is less than critical because decisionmaking will most
often be compromised by political or social disposition.
The phrasing of the burden of proof or standard of review
is most critical to the most "judicious" of reviewing judges.
For these judges, fidelity to principles of law and thorough
review of the trial court's actions is paramount. For them, a
change in the standard of review or burden of proof is more
likely to change a result because the quality of the judgment,
to which Justice Stevens refers in his concurring opinion, will
reflect a correct appreciation for both the burden of proof and
standard of review.
57. Id. at 1717 ("The State bears the burden of proving that an error passes muster
under this standard.").
58. Id. at 1723-25 (Stevens, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 1725 (Stevens, J., concurring).
60. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
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A. The Perspective of the Reviewing Court
There is a subtle, yet significant difference in the perspec-
tive suggested by the use of the differing standards of
Chapman and Kotteakos. The former, which focuses on the
possibility that error has contributed to judgment or sentence
imposed, presents the type of legal assessment regularly utilized
by appellate courts in reviewing evidentiary questions. That is,
the reviewing court is positioned to make an essentially objec-
tive view of the evidence. In reviewing a sufficiency claim, the
appellate court merely reviews the record to ascertain the exis-
tence of evidence which, if believed by the trier of fact, would
serve to prove an element of the offense charged. The absence
of any evidence whatsoever as to an element requires reversal
of the conviction for evidentiary insufficiency6-a finding
which triggers double jeopardy protections against further pros-
ecution."
1. Traditional "Harmlessness" Analysis
While engaging in Chapman analysis, the reviewing court
again looks at the totality of the evidence in assessing whether
it was not only sufficient to support judgment but also of such
a qualitative and quantitive nature as to negate the inference
that trial error contributed to the verdict. The issue is not the
absence of evidence, but the likelihood that error committed by
the trial court could be characterized as sufficient to have con-
tributed to the judgment. If, in the reviewing court's opinion,
the effect of the trial error is merely cumulative or insignificant
in light of overwhelming evidence, then reversal is not re-
quired.
A Chapman inquiry, much like the sufficiency assessment,
can realistically be undertaken with accuracy from the perspec-
61. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (holding that an applicant is entitled
to habeas corpus relief if it is found that upon the evidence at trial no reasonable trier
of fact could have found the applicant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt).
62. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19
(1978).
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tive of the trained advocate. The reviewing judges may simply
assess the effect of the trial error from the standpoint of the
advocate by weighing the impact of the evidence against the
evidence developed at trial.
An excellent framework for the analysis of harm was de-
veloped by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and set forth
in Harris v. State:63
A procedure for reaching this determination should: first,
isolate the error and all its effects, using the considerations
set out above and any other considerations suggested by
the facts of an individual case; and second, ask whether a
rational trier of fact might have reached a different result
if the error and its effects had not resulted.64
The Harris formulation (i.e., the Texas rule) for determination
of harmlessness is designed to calculate the "probable impact
of the error on the jury in light of the existence of the other
evidence."65
2. "Harm" Analysis Under Kotteakos/Brecht
The Texas rule was announced in terms of application of
the Chapman test for harmlessness, rather than in the context
of the Kotteakos test for harm. This distinction is significant
because Chapman harmlessness is essentially a quantitative
measure of evidence: the error's contribution to the conviction
must be overwhelmed by the existence of other, properly ad-
mitted evidence.66 With respect to Kotteakos harm, however,
63. 790 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
64. Id. at 588.
65. Bradford v. State, 873 S.W.2d 15, 21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), cert. denied sub
nom. Texas v. Bradford, 115 S. Ct. 311 (1994) (citing Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568,
587 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)). The Texas court further explained its Harris approach to
harmlessness determination by noting a number of factors to be considered in conduct-
ing the assessment, including the "source and nature of the error, whether or to what
extent it was emphasized by the State, its probable collateral implications, and consid-
er[ation of] how much weight a juror would probably place upon the error and whether
[a] determin[ation of] declaring it harmless would encourage the State to repeat it with
impunity." Id.
66. E.g., United States v. Wilson, 11 F.3d 346, 351 (2nd Cir. 1993), cert. denied
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the question more properly should be focused on the likely
misuse of constitutionally impermissible evidence or argument.
Qualitative analysis, rather than quantitative analysis, is neces-
sary to determine actual, rather than hypothetical, harm. Yet,
the Brecht Court specifically referred to the error being "quan-
titatively assessed in the context of other evidence present-
ed.
' 67
A demonstration of prejudice under Brecht almost neces-
sarily negates a harmlessness showing under Chapman. While
instructive in explaining how a reviewing court should conduct
harmlessness analysis, the burden of proof utilizing the reason-
able doubt standard requires the reviewing court to determine
whether a rational trier of fact might have reached a different
result but for the error.
The perspective demanded by application of the Kotteakos
standard is different. In making this type of prejudice determi-
nation, the reviewing court is obliged to consider whether the
evidence or trial error probably contributed to the judgment.68
In this sense, the weighing of error and evidence must be un-
dertaken from the perspective of a lay person or by using a
common juror approach.69 Matters which counsel accept as
insignificant in terms of their legal force may have an altogeth-
er different value when viewed from the standpoint of the ra-
tional, or common, juror.70
sub nom. Romero v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1415 (1994), cert. denied sub nom.
Rivera v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1563 (1994), cert. denied sub nom. Wilson v. Unit-
ed States, 114 S. Ct. 2142 (1994) (finding "overwhelming" evidence of guilt, including
eyewitness testmony of three co-conspirators cooperating with the Government, suffi-
cient to meet harmlessness tests of Chapman and Brecht).
67. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1717 (1993) (quoting Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 280 (1991)).
68. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946).
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Samuels v. Mann, 13 F.3d 522 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 145 (1994).
In this case, the evidence against Samuels likewise [as in Brecht] as
"weighty," in view of the partially corroborated confession and the eye-
witness testimony implicating Samuels in the robbery. We are mindful,
however, not to give conclusive effect to our view of the evidence and that
our ultimate task is to determine the impact the improperly admitted evi-
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An example of this situation is presented by the non-testi-
fying defendant. An accused who elects not to testify presents
no ground for adverse inference based on the decision not to
offer an explanation consistent with innocence or inconsistent
with guilt.7 This proposition is clearly accepted as a conse-
quence of the Fifth Amendment protection afforded an accused.
No appellate judge would predicate an affirmance on the fact
that the accused had declined to testify in his own behalf at
trial. Such a conclusion would be subject to the most basic of
constitutional attacks.72
From the perspective of the common juror, however, the
same assumption cannot be drawn. The common juror, having
no specific education concerning the Fifth Amendment privilege
and the preclusion of consideration of the accused's exercise of
his Fifth Amendment rights, cannot be assumed to draw no
adverse inference from the accused's decision not to testify.
This basic difference in perspective explains the Court's deci-
sions in Carter v. Kentucky, 73 James v. Kentucky,74 and, par-
ticularly, in Lakeside v. Oregon.75 In Lakeside, the Court went
so far as to remove from the defendant's discretion the trial
dence had or reasonably may have had upon the minds of the jury.
Id. at 528 (emphasis added).
71. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
72. For example, in O'Connor v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 92 (1966), the Court excused a
procedural default in state trial court when counsel for the accused failed to timely
interpose an objection to an improper comment on the defendant's silence in applying
Griffin retroactively to the non-final claim raised by the defense. The O'Connor
Court's willingness to excuse procedural default is likely now overruled by Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), but its position on retroactivity correctly anticipated
the Court's later holding in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989). Nevertheless,
the holding in O'Connor demonstrates the significance with which improper comments
on the accused's silence were viewed at the time of the Court's initial decisions on this
issue.
73. 450 U.S. 288 (1981). A defense request for a cautionary instruction advising
the jury not to consider the accused's silence as evidence of guilt must be granted by
the trial court to avoid a violation of his Fifth Amendment right. Id.
74. 466 U.S. 341 (1984). The Court extended its decision in Carter v. Kentucky to
include a defense request for an admonition to the jury not to consider the accused's
silence, even though under Kentucky law an "admonition" differs from an "instruc-
tion." Id.
75. 435 U.S. 333 (1978).
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court's decision to instruct the jury not to draw an adverse
inference from the accused's decision not to testify, regardless
of the perceived tactical value which might be claimed by not
having the jury's attention drawn to the accused's silence in
any fashion.
7 6
From the standpoint of the trained advocate, a comment on
the accused's silence, standing alone, is inherently prejudicial.
For the appellate court applying the Chapman rule, that preju-
dice requires reversal unless the evidence of guilt is so over-
whelming that the prejudice could not reasonably be said to
have influenced the jury to convict.77 However, when the
same comment is considered from the standpoint of a juror
untrained in the law, the assessment of the impact of the com-
ment requires divorcing one's legal training from that consider-
ation. While counsel and reviewing judges understand that the
prejudicial nature of the comment on silence is not a proper
subject for evaluation of guilt, jurors do not necessarily bring
this same understanding to the trial process.
The Brecht majority engaged in a rather simplistic analysis
to support its conclusion that the disclosure of the petitioner's
post-Miranda silence did not likely prejudice his trial. The
Chief Justice merely noted that the comments concerning this
aspect of his post-arrest comments comprised less than two
pages of the nine-hundred-page trial transcript in the case.7"
The Court implied that error can properly be evaluated in terms
of its prevalence within the overall trial transcript. However,
the significance of the error does not lie in repetition or even
emphasis alone. This is particularly likely to be true when the
error is viewed from the standpoint of the lay juror, rather than
the trained lawyer/judge. A lay juror is more susceptible to im-
proper inferences which may rationally, but not legally, be
76. Id. at 340-41.
77. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) (involving the Court's exer-
cise of its supervisory power over federal criminal prosecutions, rather than explication
of constitutional protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment). The Court essentially
applied the Chapman harmless-error test to a comment on the accused's decision not to
testify. Id.
78. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722.
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drawn from the evidence. The underlying theory of admission
of post-arrest silence in any event is its significance in deter-
mining the accused's expression of culpability through tacit
acceptance of guilty knowledge. Thus, a mere improper refer-
ence to such post-arrest silence, occurring in the context of a
Miranda violation, may influence a lay juror to consider this
silence as evidence of guilt, regardless of the fact that the
comment or reference itself occurs at a single point during a
lengthy trial.
The need to instruct jurors to disregard an objectionable
comment on an accused's silence is directly related to their
general lack of familiarity with the extreme significance at-
tached to the exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Once
the reviewing court considers the comment in the context of a
trial in which there is no overwhelming evidence permitting the
inference that the comment did not improperly cause a convic-
tion, the reviewing court is obligated to adopt the posture of
the jury in reaching a conclusion on probable prejudice. Rather
than weighing the error against the evidence in terms of legal
sufficiency, the appellate court must consider how an otherwise
insignificant error, in terms of the quantum of evidence pre-
sented, would affect non-trained jurors. Once the evidence
reviewed in a given case proves not to be overwhelming, the
reviewing court must shift its own perspective from an objec-
tive evaluation of the significance of the error in light of the
totality of the trial to a subjective consideration of the probable
effect of the error on the jury's decisionmaking.
The proposition that the quality of decisionmaking by the
reviewing judges is more critical to a correct outcome than to
the precise standard utilized for review may be correct, as Jus-
tice Stevens claims, but the issue implies far more than mere
deference to semantics. In fact, the Court itself has consistently
expressed reservations about attempting to assess the actual
process of deliberation by which a jury reaches its verdict. For
example, in Romano v. Oklahoma79 the majority declined to
find constitutional error in disclosure of a previously imposed
79. 114 S. Ct. 2004 (1994).
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death sentence against an accused in a second capital sentenc-
ing hearing. The majority concluded that the disclosure did not
result in a due process violation because the court's charge did
not provide any basis for consideration of the prior death sen-
tence by the jury that deliberated the accused's fate in the sec-
ond prosecution."0 However, the majority did recognize, as the
majority did in Keeble v. United States,8 that the jury might
not have complied with the trial court's instructions:
Even assuming that the jury disregarded the trial court's
instructions and allowed the evidence of petitioner's prior
death sentence to influence its decision, it is impossible to
know how this evidence might have affected the jury. It
seems equally plausible that the evidence could have made
the jurors more inclined to impose a death sentence, or it
could have made them less inclined to do so. Either con-
clusion necessarily rests upon one's intuition. To hold on
the basis of this record that the admission of evidence
relating to petitioner's sentence in the Thompson case
rendered petitioner's sentencing proceeding for the Sarfaty
murder fundamentally unfair would thus be an exercise in
speculation, rather than reasoned judgment.82
This candid admission by the Chief Justice, writing for the
Romano majority, is offered to support a rejection of the claim
that improper admission of evidence, which constitutes "trial
error" under the catergorization authorized in Brecht, could be
susceptible to a valid prejudice determination.83 The problem
80. Id. at 2012.
81. 412 U.S. 205 (1973). Justice Brennan observed that the problem posed by the
jury instructions in Keeble that did not include a lesser-included offense instruction is
that a jury will not necessarily comply with its duty to acquit on a greater offense if
the evidence would have required a different result had the charge included an instruc-
tion on a lesser-included offense. The jury in such a case is required to either acquit
and permit an offense to go unpunished or convict on the greater offense which might
not be proved by evidence which would otherwise be sufficient to convince jurors. Id.
82. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2012-13 (emphasis added).
83. Id. "Even assuming that the jury disregarded the trial court's instructions and
allowed the evidence of petitioner's prior death sentence to influence its decision, it is
impossible to know how this evience might have affected the jury." Id. at 2012 (empha-
sis added).
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presented by Brecht, of course, is that it relies on precisely this
type of speculation as to the actual use or misuse of evidence
by a jury in its deliberations.
Similarly, in another recent death penalty decision, Schiro
v. Farley,4 the Court's conservative majority again refused to
engage in judicial second-guessing about a jury's underlying
motivation for returning a punishment verdict arguably incon-
sistent with the guilty verdict." Schiro does not represent a
novel or new position in this regard, as the Court's historical
position on inconsistent jury verdicts demonstrates. At least
since its decision in Dunn v. United States,6 the Court has
rejected arguments attacking the rationality of jury verdicts of
conviction as to some, but not all, counts on multi-count indict-
ments as internally inconsistent. 7 Recognizing that jury incon-
sistency may be attributed to preference for leniency 8 or juror
confusion concerning the applicable law or its role in deciding
issues of fact, the Court has deferred to the jury's ultimate role
as arbiter of facts, regardless of the arguable inconsistency.
The same hesitance to engage in retrospective assumption
concerning jury activity in reaching a verdict has attended the
Court's jury instruction cases prior to application of the
Kotteakos rule in Brecht. For example, in Sandstrom v. Mon-
tana,9 the Court ruled that use of a constitutionally imper-
missible mandatory or conclusive presumption required reversal
precisely because the jury's actual reliance on the erroneous in-
struction could not be ascertained with accuracy.9" Conse-
quently, rather than requiring the accused to prove that the in-
84. 114 S. Ct. 783 (1994).
85. Id. at 791. "[Slince it was not clear to the jury that it needed to consider each
count independently, we will not draw any particular conclusion from its failure to
return a verdict on Count I." Id.
86. Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932).
87. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984) (extending the rule that a de-
fendant may not challenge inconsistent verdicts to preclude challenge where jury ac-
quitted on predicate felony, but convicted on compound felony relying on the predicate
felony in multi-count indictment).
88. Id. at 66.
89. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
90. Id. at 526.
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struction was prejudicial, the Sandstrom Court remanded the
cause, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt on the ques-
tion of prejudice.9'
Subsequent decisions, extending the Chapman harmless-
error analysis to other instructions that impermissibly shift or
lower the prosecution's burden of proof, continued the policy
of favoring an accused whose trial is potentially tainted by the
use of an improper instruction unless that constitutional error
could be shown to have been harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.92  Application of the Kotteakos/Brecht formulation,
which requires a showing of likely prejudice from use of an
infirm instruction, clearly mandates the type of speculation into
jury deliberations which the Court previously sought to avoid
when evaluating constitutional claims.
In contrast to the abstract question posed by the Chapman
analysis-whether the error could have contributed unfairly to
the verdict, the test approved in Brecht requires the reviewing
court to essentially reweigh the evidence offered in order to
determine the likelihood of prejudice. This is a function which
appellate courts have traditionally declined to pursue-the re-
weighing of evidence after verdict has been returned by a jury
sitting as fact-finder in a criminal case.93
For instance, in Lockhart v. Nelson,94 the petitioner sought
the Court's consideration of the likely implication trial error
would have in determining the overall sufficiency of evidence.
The Court declined to approve reweighing of the properly ad-
missible evidence in order to arrive at a sufficiency determi-
91. Id. at 527.
92. See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 583-84 (1986); Connecticut v. Johnson, 460
U.S. 73, 83-84 (1983).
93. In fact, in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), the Court expressly held
that the reviewing court should evaluate sufficiency claims not by reweighing evidence
admitted at trial, but by considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict to determine whether it was sufficient to establish all elements of the offense
upon which the jury convicted. This standard emphasizes deference to the jury in the
decisionmaking process, rather than supplanting jury assessment of the evidence with
that undertaken by an appellate court.
94. 488 U.S. 33 (1988).
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nation.95 The approach the petitioner advocated in Lockhart
would have effectively supplanted the jury's determination with
a re-assessment of evidence by the appellate court.96
Yet a court, charged with considering prejudice in terms of
review of the trial record rather than observing the trial as it
took place, performs much the same type of speculation as that
rejected by the Supreme Court in Lockhart.97  Now, the
Brecht/Kotteakos formula virtually demands that a federal habe-
as court review evidence in a case in which the claimed error
cannot be dismissed as harmless by requiring that the court
reweigh the evidence which the state court jury heard and pre-
sumably considered at trial.
B. The Assignment of the "Burden" of Proof
The ultimate disposition of the question as to how the
burden of proof must be shouldered in a federal habeas action
awaited the Court's decision in O'Neal v. McAninch.98 The
question presented by the petitioner asked whether the State
must bear the burden of proving that constitutional trial error is
harmless under Brecht.99 Clearly, Brecht changed the standard
or formula for determining when error requires relief from a
95. Id.
96. Id. The issue had been reserved by the Court in its decision in Greene v.
Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 26 n.9 (1978). The Lockhart Court phrased the issue: "Whether
the Double Jeopardy Clause allows retrial when a reviewing court determines that a
defendant's conviction must be reversed because evidence was erroneously admitted
against him, and also concludes that without the inadmissible evidence there was insuf-
ficient evidence to support a conviction . Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 40 (emphasis add-
ed).
97. The Lockhart majority declined to hold that the appellate court must refuse to
consider erroneously admitted evidence as part of its sufficiency analysis, opting in-
stead for retrial which "merely recreates the situation that would have been obtained if
the trial court had excluded the evidence" and thus, affords the prosecution the oppor-
tunity to offer other evidence, if available, to meet its constitutional burden. Lockhart,
488 U.S. at 42.
98. 115 S. Ct. 992 (1995).
99. The Sixth Circuit had held that the federal habeas petitioner bore the "burden
of establishing" prejudice in the state court's commission of federal constitutional er-
ror. O'Neal v. Morris, 3 F.3d 143, 145 (6th Cir. 1993), vacated sub nom. O'Neal v.
McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 992 (1995).
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standard of harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt"°0 to one
in which relief is granted only upon a showing of some preju-
dice to the accused's right to fair trial under the Kotteakos
rule.
Moreover, the majority opinion in Brecht seemed to con-
template a shift in the burden of proving that error has resulted
in prejudice to the federal petitioner-a burden allocated to the
prosecution under the Chapman harmless-error approach. While
Justice Stevens adhered to the Kotteakos principle, which in-
cluded allocation of the burden of proving that error did not
result in prejudice to the prosecution,"0 ' his additional willing-
ness to join the majority opinion undermined either his fidelity
to Kotteakos in terms of discharge of the burden or the
strength of the five-vote majority opinion in Brecht.
The Court's more recent holding in O'Neal v.
McAninch..2 demonstrated that the five-vote Brecht majority
was not as solid as its opinion would have suggested. Justice
Thomas, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia, dissent-
ed in O'Neal, after both justices had joined in the Brecht ma-
jority opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist." 3
The O'Neal majority opinion, authored by Justice
Breyer,"° rejected the notion that the habeas petitioner bears
a "burden" of proving prejudice in order to obtain relief 105
100. The Chapman test requires inquiry into whether there was a "reasonable possi-
bility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction."
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963));
see also supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
101. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1710-11 (1993) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring). Justice Stevens stated: "Kotteakos plainly stated that unless an error is merely
'technical,' the burden of sustaining a verdict by demonstrating that the error was
harmless rests on the prosecution. A constitutional violation, of course, would never
fall in the 'technical' category." Id. at 1723-24.
102. 115 S. Ct. 992 (1995).
103. Id. at 999.
104. Ironically, Justice Breyer replaced Justice White on the Court, and in writing
the majority opinion in O'Neal seemingly vindicated his predecessor's sharp dissent
criticizing application of the Kotteakos prejudice standard to federal habeas review of
state convictions in Brecht. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1725 (White, Blackmun & Souter, JJ.,
dissenting).
105. 115 S. Ct. at 994.
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Instead, he explained that once the constitutional violation has
been established, the habeas petitioner is entitled to relief when
the federal habeas judge is in "grave doubt" about whether the
error had "substantial and injurious effect of influence in deter-
mining the jury's verdict"-the standard imposed by the Court
in Brecht for review of state court trial error. 10 6 "Grave
doubt" is defined by the Court as arising when "in the judge's
mind, the matter is so evenly balanced that he feels himself in
virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error. ' '
The majority in O'Neal took care not to phrase the stan-
dard of review applicable to federal habeas consideration of
state court trial error that implicates federal constitutional guar-
antee in terms of a "burden of proof." Justice Breyer ex-
plained:
[W]e deliberately phrase the issue in this case in terms of
a judge's grave doubt, instead of in terms of "burden of
proof." The case before us does not involve a judge who
shifts a "burden" to help control the presentation of evi-
dence at a trial, but rather involves judges who apply a
legal standard (harmlessness) to a record that the presenta-
tion of evidence is no longer likely to affect. In such a
case, we think it conceptually clearer for the judge to ask
directly, "Do I, the judge, think that the error substantially
influenced the jury's decision?" than for the judge to try to
put the same question in terms of proof burdens (e.g., "Do
I believe the party has borne its burden of showing ...
?,,). 108
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the majority opinion is
its declaration that the petitioner obtains the benefit of a "grave
doubt" in the federal habeas court's consideration of the likeli-
hood that the error did improperly affect the outcome of the
trial.
10 9
Also interesting is Justice Breyer's attempt to distinguish
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 994-95.
109. Id. at 995.
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between the "burden of proof' normally associated with the
trial process and the "standard of review" which typically re-
flects the degree of deference an appellate court recognizes
with respect to the proceedings in the trial court."' The
Brecht formulation actually implies a "standard of proof." The
O'Neal majority addressed the assignment of the "burden of
proof' by referring to the "grave doubt" standard."'
Yet, in the context of habeas litigation, which involves a
lawsuit collaterally attacking a state judgment presumed correct,
it would hardly be inappropriate to speak in terms of a
petitioner's burden or, indeed, the prosecution's burden. In this
situation, a distinction drawn by Professor Martha S. Davis
with respect to the elements of the burden of proof may be
instructive." 2 The burden of production-the burden of going
forward with evidence-which requires a demonstration of the
existence of constitutional error in the state trial, clearly falls
on the habeas petitioner. The second burden described by Pro-
fessor Davis, the burden of persuasion, requires a party to ful-
110. See Martha S. Davis, A Basic Guide to Standards of Judicial Review, 33 S.D.
L. REV. 468, 469-70 n.4 (1988). Professor Davis explains that standards of review
actually refer to the deference given by reviewing courts to decision or actions under
review. "Standards of proof are concerned with the quantum and quality of proof that
must be presented in order to prevail on an issue." Id. at 469. The "burden" of proof
assigns the duty to present the proof to one side or the other in a dispute. Id. at 470.
For a thorough treatment of the application of these terms in the context of criminal
prosecutions, see 2 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, STANDARDS OF REVIEW (1986).
Perhaps the clearest expression of the standard of review in federal habeas cor-
pus involves the habeas court's deference to state court fact-finding. The habeas court
is required by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (Supp. IV 1992), to presume facts found by
state courts to be correct. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992); Wain-
wright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 426-29 (1985); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546
(1981). The presumption relates to "historical facts," not findings which actually reflect
mixed questions of law and facts, such as the voluntariness of a confession. Miller v.
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985). State fact-finding must be presumed correct unless
it is clearly erroneous and the "clear error" standard is the correct standard of review
which governs the habeas court's review of the proceedings in state court. Similarly, an
appellate court is obliged to treat the fact-finding by the trial court-or habeas court,
when appropriate-with similar deference. Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 864 (3d
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 439 (1994).
111. See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
112. Davis, supra note 110, at 470.
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fill the standard of proof. In this sense, Justice Breyer's opin-
ion suggests that the burden of persuasion continues to fall on
the government," 3 just as it does under traditional Chapman
analysis.
Whether denoted a "burden" or "standard" of proof, or a
"standard of review," the Court's approach in Brecht and
O'Neal suggests certain important consequences for habeas
petitioners. A change in application of any standard relating to
proof or review necessarily suggests that the relative positions
of the parties before the court have changed. Thus, a relaxation
of the Chapman harmless-error rule must mean that some peti-
tioners whose claims would have succeeded under the
Chapman rule of reversible error will now lose. Consequently,
petitioners face a burden in order to establish a right to relief
under BrechtlO'Neal higher than the burden under Chapman.
Regardless of the terminology given to the Court's action in
these cases, the net effect remains: an increased difficulty for
state inmates seeking relief in federal habeas litigation.
The Court's approach in O'Neal reversed, by implication,
the understanding of some lower federal courts that Brecht had,
in fact, imposed a burden on habeas petitioners to establish
prejudice resulting from the alleged federal constitutional rights
violations committed in the course of state trials. Specifically,
the Sixth Circuit in its opinion in O'Neal concluded that after
Brecht, "[t]he habeas petitioner bears the burden of establishing
such prejudice.""1 4 Other lower courts correctly anticipated
that the prosecution would ultimately shoulder the burden of
failing to prove that state court trial error did not prejudice the
113. For example, the First Circuit essentially held that the government bore this
burden in applying Brecht. See Ortiz v. Dubois, 19 F.3d 708, 715 (1st Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 739 (1995) ("[W]e believe that the government has met its burden
of demonstrating that the error did not 'have a substantial and injurious effect or influ-
ence in determining the jury's verdict."'(quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.
750,776 (1993))).
114. O'Neal v. Morris, 3 F.3d 143, 145 (6th Cir. 1993), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 992
(1995); see also Castillo v. Stainer, 997 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 609 (1993); Kyles v. Whitley, 5 F.3d 806, 818 (5th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 115 S. Ct.
1555 (1995); Samuels v. Mann, 13 F.3d 522, 526 (2nd Cir. 1993); Tague v. Richards,
3 F.3d 1133, 1140 (7th Cir. 1993).
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habeas petitioner."5
Chapman imposes a standard which virtually presumes
harm in the commission of constitutional error for resolution of
claims arising on direct appeal. Consequently, the State, to
avoid the grant of relief, bears the negative burden of disprov-
ing the proposition that constitutional trial error inherently prej-
udiced an accused. In contrast, the Kotteakos rule, now applica-
ble to the review of state court proceedings under Brecht, bars
relief unless some actual harm" 6 can be demonstrated by
using the formula that inquires whether the error "had substan-
tial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's
verdict.""' 7 Logically, this change in the formula for review
of state court trial error in federal habeas would suggest that
the petitioner must actually assume a burden of proving preju-
dice. In fact, the majority opinion in O'Neal expressly dis-
avows this approach." 8
In terms of the conduct of habeas litigation, the likely
consequences of a "shift" in the "burden of proof' may be less
significant than the new requirement for proof of prejudice.
Regardless of the allocation of the burden or the O'Neal
Court's rejection of the applicability of this concept, counsel
representing petitioners are now obligated to formulate a theory
of prejudice. Under Chapman, the prosecution already had the
burden of developing a theory of constitutional harmlessness.
Undoubtedly, the same reasoning will now simply be applied to
115. Relatively few circuits had adopted this view before the Supreme Court's rul-
ing in O'Neal. See, e.g., Libby v. Duval, 19 F.3d 733, 739-40 n.5 (lst Cir. 1994) (sup-
porting the proposition that prosecution bears burden of disproving prejudice with the
four dissenting votes and Justice Stevens' concurrence in Brecht), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 314 (1994); Stoner v. Sowders, 997 F.2d 209, 213 (6th Cir. 1993).
Stoner relied on Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Brecht for its holding:
"As with the Chapman standard, the prosecutors bear the burden of proof .... The
prosecution's brief has offered little more than a conclusory statement that any error
which may have occurred was harmless." Id. at 213. It is important to note that the
Stoner decision predates O'Neal in the 6th Circuit, and O'Neal puts the burden on the
petitioner without mentioning Stoner.
116. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722 (noting relief available upon showing of "actual
prejudice").
117. Id. (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
118, O'Neal, 115 S. Ct. at 995.
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demonstrate lack of prejudice from the constitutional error, if
any."1
9
From the petitioner's standpoint, however, it is essential to
develop and demonstrate a theory of prejudice. Failure to do so
will doom some claims of constitutional trial error, even though
the Court did not assign the "burden of proof' of prejudice to
the petitioner. Prior to Brecht, a habeas petitioner, needing to
demonstrate commission of constitutional error in order to trig-
ger application of the Chapman test for harmlessness, might
simply have assumed that proof of the error would be suffi-
cient to warrant relief. The Court's shift in focus toward a dif-
ferent standard of prejudice may jeopardize some claims that
would have survived failure to assert prejudice under Chapman.
The reason for this change in strategic significance of the
theory of prejudice lies in the following problems associated
with the Kotteakos/Brecht rule. A prosecutor, unable to estab-
lish harmlessness under Chapman, may also fail to convince
the habeas court even under the "likely prejudice" test of
Brecht. However, in closer cases, the State's creative assertion
of lack of prejudice may be sufficiently strong in terms of
argument to persuade conscientious jurists, who might other-
wise be inclined to believe that all constitutional error should
merit relief absent a showing of harmlessness, to conclude that
prejudice cannot be presumed, even if the burden remains
assigned to the State. Thus, the respondent's argument of lack
of demonstrable prejudice may be sufficient for rejection of the
claim for relief in the absence of an equally strong argument
of prejudice advanced by the petitioner. That is, assignment of
the burden to the State may simply force prosecutors to more
thoroughly develop arguments in cases that could not have
been won under the more stringent harmlessness test of
Chapman. To avoid rejection of the claim, petitioner's counsel
119. The prosecution's failure to establish lack of prejudice through a thorough
discussion of the error in the context of the totality of evidence will apparently result
in relief for the petitioner, regardless of whether the Chapman or Brecht standard is ap-
plied. See, e.g., Stoner, 997 F.2d at 213 ("The prosecution's brief has offered little
more than a conclusory statement that any error which may have occurred was harm-
less.").
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must vigorously argue prejudice, even though no burden of
proof beyond establishing the claim of constitutional trial error
was imposed by the Court in O'Neal.
Thus, petitioners may face a tactical need for demonstrat-
ing prejudice, or an arguable theory of prejudice, even though
they are not forced to discharge a burden of proof on this as-
pect of the federal habeas claim. The Court's change in the
standard of proof effectively compels prosecutors to argue clos-
er cases more vigorously because the higher standard for relief
promises greater success for respondents, in theory, than that
suggested by the Chapman harmlessness standard. Consequent-
ly, rather than risking default, petitioners must be prepared to
advance prejudice arguments to avoid a loss based on the
heightened burden of proof, which will work to their disadvan-
tage, even if the Court ultimately continues to require the pros-
ecution to shoulder a negative burden of proof on constitutional
trial error claims.
Unless Brecht represents a mere aberration in the Court's
progress toward a simplified and far more restrictive federal
habeas remedy, the holding should be viewed as one in which
the Court continues to stress the "extraordinary" aspect of the
remedy by limiting relief to those cases in which a constitu-
tional trial error has actually prejudiced a state court defendant
in the exercise of his right to fair trial. Interestingly, the Court
rejected a rather thoughtful proposition advanced by the State
in O'Neal. The prosecution argued that because federal habeas
relief is available under the statute only when the deprivation
of liberty is occasioned by constitutional error in the state
criminal process, a petitioner is entitled to habeas relief only if
he can demonstrate that the error resulted in or contributed to
his status of being "in custody."'2
The O'Neal majority rejected this argument, which would
have logically imposed a burden of proof upon the habeas
petitioner. The Court responded that, because the error's natural
effect is to prejudice substantial rights, the error should be
treated as prejudicial if there remains grave doubt as to wheth-
120. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988).
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er the error actually did prejudice the petitioner.'2' The
O'Neal majority's reasoning is consistent with its reading of
Kotteakos, upon which the decision in Brecht relied for its
application of a prejudice standard in the review of state court
trial error, but the prosecution's argument appears more faithful
to the intent of 28 U.S.C. § 2254.121
IV. DETERMINATION OF PREJUDICE BY THE FEDERAL
HABEAS COURT
In applying the Kotteakos standard to constitutional claims
brought by state inmates, federal courts are now required to
consider the significance of the claimed error in the
decisionmaking process, rather than simply determining whether
the error is harmless under the Chapman standard. The qualita-
tive nature of this judgment is particularly important because it
requires the reviewing court to view the evidence from a per-
spective different from that typically taken by a trial level
court. Although trial judges routinely make decisions about the
character and probative value of evidence in making evidentiary
decisions, particularly when balancing the potential for unfair
prejudice inherent in a particular item of evidence against its
probative value, they seldom do this on a completed trial re-
cord.
The habeas court, in contrast, must review a state trial
record to arrive at a judgment regarding prejudice to the
accused's fair trial right inherent in an established constitutional
trial error. The Kotteakos standard clearly requires that the
court afford the accused relief only if the trial error actually af-
fected the jury's deliberations-a standard much closer to the
evaluation of effectiveness of counsel, articulated by the Court
in Strickland v. Washington,' than the standard employed in
121. O'Neal, 115 S. Ct. at 998.
122. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988).
123. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In Strickland, the Court held that deficient perfor-
mance of counsel was not sufficient, taken alone, to demonstrate a violation of the
Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance. The accused must not only demon-
strate a defect in counsel's performance, but also establish that the defect probably
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harmless-error decisions. The difficulty in making either a
Kotteakos or Strickland evaluation lies in the fact that the re-
viewing court must consider not only the totality of the evi-
dence available from which reasonable inferences might be
drawn to support the verdict, but also the probable effect of
trial court rulings on the jury's use of the available evidence in
its deliberations on the questions of guilt or sentence.
Two threshold problems are posed by the federal habeas
court in applying the rule of Brecht to the evaluation of consti-
tutional claims brought by state inmates. First, even assuming
that the petitioner demonstrates trial error that implicates a fed-
erally protected right, that claim will have been previously liti-
gated in state appellate courts as part of the normal exhaustion
process. A state appellate court, complying with the Chapman
harmless-error analysis, must conclude that the error was harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt in order to reach its decision to
affirm. Because state court factual findings are entitled to a
presumption of correctness under subsection (d) of § 2254,124
one might assume that a finding of harmlessness would, there-
fore, be binding on a federal habeas court precisely because it
involves a weighing of evidence and a consideration of facts.
However, prior state determinations of harmlessness have not
been viewed as pure factual determinations at all; rather, they
involve mixed determinations of law and fact.125 Had these
determinations been subject to the presumption of regularity
and deference accorded pure questions of fact, Brecht would
have made no sense because the federal habeas court would
have been required to defer to the state appellate court's deter-
mination that the error was harmless under Chapman.
Second, even though the Kotteakos rule represents a rather
long-held position within the jurisprudence of federal habeas
actions brought by federal inmates, 26 it is unlikely that this
contributed to an incorrect result or probably prejudiced the accused.
124. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981).
125. Jackson v. Dugger, 931 F.2d 712 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Singletary
v. Jackson, 502 U.S. 973 (1991); Grizzell v. Wainwright, 692 F.2d 722, 725 (11 th Cir.
1982), cert. denied sub nom. Wainwright v. Grizzell, 461 U.S. 948 (1983).
126. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988).
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rule is regularly employed by district courts and magistrate
judges in evaluating habeas claims because most trial error
claims in the federal system must have initially been presented
on direct appeal." 7 Once litigated on direct appeal in the cir-
cuit court, trial error claims in the federal system are not sub-
ject to relitigation by post-conviction writ, absent a showing of
a change in fact or law that would support a reconsideration of
the disposition." 8 Thus, despite the traditional dual role of
federal district courts in considering habeas petitions brought by
federal and state inmates, it appears unlikely that these courts
extensively applied Kotteakos analysis in their consideration of
federal habeas applications in the past. Brecht now requires
familiarity with both the role and the framework for its appli-
cation in order to review state inmate petitions presenting
claims previously unlitigated in the federal system.
Moreover, the role of the district court and magistrate
judge in reaching factual conclusions concerning the prejudice
resulting from state court constitutional trial error may prove
particularly critical within the federal system. The determination
that prejudice has resulted from the trial error, or, indeed, that
it has not, will be subject to deference on appeal from the
district court's disposition of the writ.'29 However, the legal
issue of whether the writ should be issued remains subject to
de novo review in the court of appeals, because it concerns a
mixed question of law and fact. 30
127. See Feldman v. Henmen, 815 F.2d 1318, 1321 (9th Cir. 1987).
128. See Taylor v. United States, 798 F.2d 271, 273 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1056 (1987).
129. See, e.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 894 F.2d 1009 (8th Cir.) (holding that district
court's acceptance of petitioner's testimony regarding advice rendered by counsel enti-
tled to deference on appeal unless clearly erroneous), cert. denied sub nom. Lockhart v.
Hill, 497 U.S. 1011 (1990); Chitwood v. Dowd, 889 F.2d 781, 785 (8th Cir. 1989)
(holding that district court's decision that special circumstances exist such that habeas
corpus relief may be granted even though state remedy not exhausted is finding of fact
subject to deference on appeal), cert. denied sub nom. Dowd v. Chitwood, 495 U.S.
953 (1990); Thompson v. Armontrout, 808 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that dis-
trict court's finding on allegation of vindictiveness entitled to deference unless clearly
erroneous), cert. denied sub noma. Armontrout v. Thompson, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987).
130. Bliss v. Lockhart, 891 F.2d 1335 (8th Cir. 1989).
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Due to the importance likely to be attached to the fact-
finding initially conducted by the district court and magistrate
judge, a framework for the application of the Kotteakos/Brecht
rule is particularly desirable in order to reach a relatively uni-
form application of the standard to the disparate issues and
evidentiary contexts in which the rule will be employed. Be-
cause almost all trial error is now subject to harmless-error
analysis, even including admission of a coerced confession, 3'
it is unlikely that any framework developed for assessing the
impact of constitutional error is beyond critique. If, for exam-
ple, error is "harmless" under Chapman, it certainly does not
warrant relief under Brecht. However, that obvious conclusion
does not preclude a consideration of common circumstances
which may direct a reviewing court in its assessment of likely
prejudice resulting from constitutional error.
A number of scenarios suggest the appropriateness of relief
in the event constitutional trial error is demonstrated by the
habeas petitioner. By their very nature, these assume that the
evidence is otherwise legally sufficient to support conviction
under the Jackson standard,'32 even though a challenge to suf-
ficiency itself is subject to independent consideration in the
federal habeas action.'33 Consequently, the reviewing court
must consider whether the error could have influenced the
jury's verdict irrespective of the existence of the otherwise
sufficient evidence supporting conviction. Otherwise, the habeas
court's review can virtually always be considered superficial in
failing to consider the extent to which that same evidence
would not have resulted in conviction but for the trial court's
ruling. The following scenarios demonstrate that relief is almost
always appropriate for the federal petitioner, assuming that the
trial error is properly preserved and ruled on by the state
131. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (requiring reviewing court to exer-
cise extreme caution in holding improperly admitted confession "harmless" in light of
profound impact of confession on jury deliberations).
132. See supra notes 61, 93 and accompanying text.
133. Closs v. Leapley, 18 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1994) (denying pro se petition at-
tacking evidentiary sufficiency based on state court's conclusion improper without
consideration of factual and legal basis for state court's opinion on the record).
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courts. 134
A. Error Resulting in Admission of Evidence Essential to
Support Conviction
Clearly, error in the admission of evidence which would
permit the prosecution to establish an essential element of its
case would appear to always establish a constitutional violation
that would require federal habeas relief under Brecht. In order
to secure a constitutionally sufficient conviction under Jackson
v. Virginia,'35 the government is required to prove each ele-
ment of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Al-
though the evidence must be reviewed in a light most favorable
to the trial court's verdict under Jackson, absence of proof as
to any element of the prosecution's case will require reversal
on appeal and also bar further prosecution.'36
Where the trial court improperly admits evidence that
would require reversal of conviction, the reviewing court may
afford federal habeas relief. However, all errors in admission of
evidence do not implicate constitutional guarantees. Unless the
trial error has a constitutional cast, relief is not appropriate in
federal habeas corpus simply because a state court improperly
admitted evidence critical to the prosecution's satisfaction of
its burden of proof.'37 In fact, in this context the "trial error"
134. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b) and (c) require that claims of federal rights violations be
initially asserted in state court proceedings. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982).
However, despite the duty imposed on the State to plead failure of exhaustion in state
courts as a bar to consideration of unexhausted claims, failure to plead this defense
affords federal courts authority to consider unexhausted claims on the merits.
Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1987).
135. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
136. Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978).
137. The most obvious overlap between evidentiary principles and constitutional
concerns involves the problem posed by admission of testimony which would be
excludable as hearsay but for the existence of an exception to the hearsay rule. Admis-
sion of out-of-court declarations made by an unavailable declarant always pose the
threat of a Confrontation Clause violation of the protection afforded by the Sixth
Amendment. In such a case, properly preserved error would typically include an objec-
tion to this testimony or evidence based on both the Sixth Amendment guarantee and
the hearsay rule, or violation of the technical requirements for admission of the evi-
dence pursuant to an exception. While the evidence might prove admissible pursuant to
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concept has previously been employed by appellate courts in
holding that errors in admission of evidence do not require
retrial even though improperly admitted evidence might form a
critical component of the prosecution's case.'38
If, however, a constitutional claim of improper admission
of evidence has been preserved and rejected by state courts, a
finding that constitutional error did occur would require rever-
sal if the conviction required jury consideration of the improp-
erly admitted evidence in order to establish an element of the
offense. In this circumstance, the constitutional error necessarily
had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determin-
ing the jury's verdict."' 39 Otherwise, the evidence would not
have been sufficient to support conviction, and the jury pre-
sumably would have acquitted or convicted on a lesser-included
offense.
B. Error Resulting from Jury Instructions Improperly
Authorizing Conviction
A second category of state trial error which would justify
federal relief involves an incorrect instruction that authorizes
the defendant's conviction. While matters of constitutionally
defective jury instructions are generally subject to harmless-
error analysis, 4 ' the general principle is inapplicable to con-
sideration of an instruction actually authorizing conviction on
state evidentiary rule, this determination would not necessarily bind the habeas court in
its consideration of the constitutional claim. Compare Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139
(1990) and White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992). The objection might also include a
state constitutional or statutory basis as well, although the federal habeas court is not
empowered to enforce this protection. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780-81 (1990).
138. See Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988) (holding appellate court is not to
exclude improperly admitted evidence in considering sufficiency challenge); Tapp v.
Lucas, 658 F.2d 383, 385 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972
(1982) (holding that trial error in improper admission of evidence is necessary to prove
all elements of offense does not warrant reversal for evidentiary insufficiency barring
retrial, despite appellate court's observation that in the absence of improperly admitted
evidence, prosecution's case was insufficient to support conviction).
139. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946).
140. E.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 (1991) (applying harmless-error test to in-
struction improperly shifting the burden of proof to accused).
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an incorrect theory of state law or a theory wholly inapplicable
to the offense charged.
For example, if the instruction permitted conviction on a
theory of the offense not charged in the indictment or informa-
tion, the resulting conviction would prove constitutionally in-
firm either because the accused had no notice of the
prosecution's intended theory of the offense or because the evi-
dence adduced at trial would vary from the theory alleged in
the charging instrument. In Allen v. State,' the Arkansas Su-
preme Court reversed a defendant's conviction for first-degree
murder which may have resulted from the inclusion of an in-
correct first-degree felony murder jury instruction. The defen-
dant was charged with premeditated and deliberate capital mur-
der, rather than felony capital murder. The court ruled that
first-degree felony murder for which the defendant ultimately
may have been convicted was not a lesser-included offense
under Arkansas law.'42 Because deliberate and felony murder
theories of capital murder describe different offenses under
state law, rather than a variation in proof of intentional killing,
which supported the Supreme Court's narrow decision in Schad
v. Arizona,'43 the Arkansas scheme for defining the capital
offense required reversal. The constitutional challenge in this
instance, had it been necessary to preserve and litigate the
issue in a federal habeas court, could have rested upon either a
Sixth Amendment notice theory or general due process'" alle-
gation that the instruction permitted the jury to reach a non-
unanimous verdict inconsistent with the Court's holding in
Schad.
The decision in Allen illustrates an important consideration
regarding the application of "harmlessness" analysis in this type
141. 838 S.W.2d 346 (Ark. 1992).
142. Id.
143. 501 U.S. 624 (1991).
144. For instance, in Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110 (1991), the Court reversed
the defendant's capital sentence where the charging instrument did not afford plain
notice that the death penalty would be sought in the case. The Court's holding was
predicated on due process grounds, although the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of no-
tice would appear to afford an alternative theory for relief.
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of situation. 4" The verdict form returned by the jury did not
reflect which theory of first-degree murder the jury based its
decision to convict. 4 6 Consequently, the state supreme court
was unable to conclude that the error in this instance-an im-
proper instruction on first-degree felony murder-was, in fact,
harmless; the jury had reached its decision based on an alter-
native theory of first-degree murder, a purposeful killing, which
was an appropriate lesser-included offense of premeditated and
deliberate capital murder.'47 Had a special verdict been re-
turned reflecting that the conviction was based on a correct
theory of the lesser charge, the court might well have conclud-
ed that the potential confusion, created by including the inap-
plicable lesser instruction, was harmless.
C. Error in Exclusion of Admissible Evidence Requiring
Instruction on Defensive Theory or Lesser-Included Offense
Trial error in improperly excluding defensive evidence
which would require instruction on a defensive theory or less-
er-included offense, not otherwise included in the court's
charge, would almost always appear to be prejudicial and inju-
rious to the defendant's right to a fair trial. Harmlessness
would only occur if the defendant was convicted of a lesser-in-
cluded offense to which the defensive theory would not have
applied or of an offense no more onerous than that supported
by the improperly excluded evidence. Given the general rule
that defensive instructions, including lesser-included offense
instructions, are available if supported by any evidence,'48 ex-
clusion of evidence which would have required the giving of a
defensive instruction typically results in reversible error.
Exclusion of evidence supporting a defensive theory at trial
145. Allen, 838 S.W.2d at 347.
146. Id. at 346.
147. Id.
148. E.g., Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205 (1973) (allowing an instruction on
a lesser-included offense was allowed because the evidence warranted such instruction,
even though the lesser-included offense was not specified in the Act, where a Native-
American was prosecuted under the Major Crimes Act).
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may be cast in constitutional terms, particularly when the de-
fendant argues that a violation of the Compulsory Process
Clause has occurred. 4 9 This provision affords a criminal de-
fendant a general right to present his defense to the trier of
fact through access to a legal process designed to compel the
attendance of witnesses having favorable testimony at trial.
Historically, the clause has been used to override state eviden-
tiary rules barring the use of certain classes of testimony based
upon witness incompetence determinations. Thus, in the leading
Compulsory Process Clause case, Washington v. Texas,150 the
Sixth Amendment right was relied upon to override a Texas
rule which declared co-defendants incompetent as witnesses for
the defense. Similarly, in Rock v. Arkansas,5' the Court held
that a per se state evidence rule could not be relied upon to
bar the use of hypnotically refreshed testimony, which was the
basis for the exclusion of the defendant's own testimony at
trial.
This type of error is inherently substantial and injurious in
depriving the jury of any opportunity to consider defensive
theories which might have otherwise been available to the ac-
cused at trial. Even though evidence may overwhelmingly sup-
port guilt, the actual determination cannot be deemed reliable if
the trier of fact was denied access to alternative verdicts upon
which justification, excuse, or mitigation could have been pred-
icated. Exclusion of non-cumulative evidence sufficient to sup-
port defensive instructions would constitute the type of con-
stitutional trial error virtually demanding relief.
D. Error in Refusing Defensive Instruction or Lesser-Included
Offense Instruction
A trial court's refusal to instruct on lesser-included offens-
es or defensive theories supported by evidence admitted at trial
is generally subject to reversal in state courts. 5' There are, of
149. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
150. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
151. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
152. See Hill v. State, 634 S.W.2d 120, 121 (Ark. 1982) ("We have consistently
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course, peculiar exceptions to the general rule depending on the
jurisdiction, such as in those jurisdictions in which the
accused's denial of commission of any offense renders failure
to instruct on a lesser offense harmless, if erroneous at all,'53
and those where conviction on a greater offense results, despite
instruction on a degree of a lesser-included offense higher than
the degree of the lesser-included offense upon which instruction
has been refused. 54 Nevertheless, absent a particular local
rule which would serve to excuse apparent trial court error, a
refusal to instruct on a defensive instruction or lesser-included
offense would always constitute a prejudicial error.
Moreover, a trial court's refusal to instruct on a lesser-
included offense properly raised by the excluded evidence
might itself constitute a due process violation, as suggested by
the Court's opinion in Beck v. Alabama.'55 Assertion of a due
process claim in a federal petition attacking a state conviction
in which the accused was deprived of a lesser-included offense
instruction to which he was entitled based on evidence admit-
ted at trial should meet the standard of prejudice required for
relief under Brecht.1
56
Virtually all other trial error claims raising constitutional
questions must be considered in light of traditional harm
analysis precisely because the error must be evaluated in light
held that a trial court commits reversible error when it refuses to give a correct instruc-
tion defining a lesser-included offense and its punishment when there is testimony on
which the defendant might be found guilty of the lesser rather than the greater of-
fense."); Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343 (1965) (holding that federal standard
for determination of lesser-included offense evidence requires instruction).
153. E.g., Flurry v. State, 720 S.W.2d 699 (Ark. 1986) (holding that failure to in-
struct on lesser-included offense of rape was not error where accused denied commis-
sion of any offense).
154. E.g., McKinnon v. State, 695 S.W.2d 826, 827 (Ark. 1985), habeas corpus
denied sub nom. McKinnon v. Lockhart, 921 F.2d 830 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
501 U.S. 1208 (1991).
155. 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (voiding death penalty imposed pursuant to state scheme
which precluded trial judge from instructing jury on lesser-included homicide offense
in capital case).
156. See supra note 56 and accompanying text; e.g., Cordova v. Lynaugh, 838 F.2d
764, 770 n.8 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Lynaugh v. Cordova, 486 U.S. 1061
(1988).
Vol. 26
The "Burden" of Proof
of the totality of the evidence adduced at trial."' Assignment
of the burden of proving prejudice to the petitioner in the
federal habeas action may involve far more than proving that
the constitutional trial error might have caused the jury to
reach a result different from that which would have resulted
had the error not occurred. Instead, the Brecht rule requires the
petitioner to demonstrate "actual prejudice:"
The test under Kotteakos is whether the error "had sub-
stantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
jury's verdict." Under this standard, habeas petitioners
may obtain plenary review of their constitutional claims,
but they are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial
error unless they can establish that it resulted in "actual
prejudice. ""'
Thus, proof of prejudice under a strict Kotteakos/Brecht
formulation does not amount to an unequivocal finding of
harmlessness, which would require reversal under the Chapman
formula.159 However, under O'Neal, an unequivocal finding on
the issue of harmlessness results in the "grave doubt" which
the Court directs should inure to the benefit of the habeas
petitioner. 60 Rather than reaching a conclusion as to whether
the error might have impacted the jury's consideration of the
evidence in convicting, Brecht apparently requires a positive
finding that the error did taint the proceedings, or at the least
an inability to conclude that it did not. This conclusion is
reached to the extent that it can be done without attempting to
interview jurors in order to assess the actual impact of the
error.
157. The Brecht Court relied on Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 280 (1990),
for the proposition that "trial error" is particularly "amenable to harmless-error analysis
because it 'may ... be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence present-
ed in order"' to assess likely prejudice to the accused. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1717
(quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 280 (1991)).
158. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722 (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting United
States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)).
159. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
160. O'Neal v. McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 992, 994 (1995).
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V. THE ROLE OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS IN ENFORCING
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES
What is clear from the Court's decision in Brecht is that
federal habeas does not represent merely another step in the
appellate process available to defendants convicted in state
court proceedings. The habeas court does not sit to review the
disposition of federal constitutional claims by state courts; in
fact, the majority opinion in Brecht disavows any contention
that state courts have failed in their enforcement of federal
constitutional rights. 6' Instead, federal habeas exists merely to
vindicate federal rights violations when such violations have
resulted in some actual or presumed prejudice to a state court
defendant resulting in a constitutionally impermissible convic-
tion or confinement.'62 This approach is certainly consistent
with the legislative intent expressed in 28 U.S.C. § 2254,163
but it raises questions concerning the relationship between state
and federal courts in the enforcement of federal constitutional
rights.
Initially, it is clear that the Court rejects the argument that
state courts will prove less vigorous in enforcement of federal
constitutional rights with the adoption of the Kotteakos rule."64
161. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1721.
Petitioner argues that application of the Chapman harmless-error standard
on collateral review is necessary to deter state courts from relaxing their
own guard in reviewing constitutional error and to discourage prosecutors
from committing error in the first place. Absent affirmative evidence that
state-court judges are ignoring their oath, we discount petitioner's argu-
ment that courts will respond to our ruling by violating their Article VI
duty to uphold the Constitution.
Id.
162. Id. "Moreover, granting habeas relief merely because there is a 'reasonable
probability' that trial error contributed to the verdict.., is at odds with the historic
meaning of habeas corpus-to afford relief to those whom society has 'grievously
wronged."' Id. (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
163. A federal court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1977) (emphasis added), cited in Brecht, 113 S.
Ct. at 1718.
164. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1721. "Absent affirmative evidence that state-court judges
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Yet, the existence of the federal habeas remedy necessarily
recognizes that state courts represent merely a first line of de-
fense in the protection of those guarantees. Otherwise, there
would have been no rationale to support the congressional
adoption of § 2254.
Moreover, the Brecht majority's expressed reliance on the
accuracy and integrity of state appellate court decisionmaking
runs contrary to the Court's decision in Michigan v. Long.'65
In Long, the Court applied a presumptive rule of jurisdiction to
afford it the power to consider state appellate judgments even
arguably resting upon the application of federal constitutional
authority.'66 Under this rationale, a state appellate decision in-
terpreting a right arising under both federal and state consti-
tutions is subject to review by the Court unless it rests on "bo-
na fide separate, adequate, and independent state grounds."'67
The deference by the Brecht Court shown to state appellate
decisionmaking in their enforcement of federally protected
rights did not persuade the majority in Long 168 that state court
construction of constitutional guarantees could proceed without
intervention on certiorari.'69 Clearly, a distinction can be
drawn between interpretation of constitutional language and
application of well-defined principles to particular factual sce-
narios. But, as Justice White observed in his Brecht dissent, if
state courts were accurately enforcing federal constitutional
protections, then continued reliance on the Chapman harmless-
error standard in federal habeas review would entail no cost.
Whereas, if they are failing to address federal constitutional
protections, this is precisely the situation federal habeas is de-
signed to address. 7'
are ignoring their oath, we discount petitioner's argument that courts will respond to
our ruling by violating their Article VI duty to uphold the Constitution." Id.; see also
supra note 149 and accompanying text.
165. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
166. Id. at 1042.
167. Id. at 1041.
168. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
169. Id. at 1041.
170. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1728 (White, J., dissenting). Similarly, in Wright v. West,
505 U.S. 277 (1992), a fragmented Court retained the tradition of de novo review in
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While the Brecht majority dismissed the argument that
application of a less rigorous standard for enforcement in feder-
al habeas would encourage state appellate courts to relax their
enforcement, the imposition of the prejudice rule does permit
that relaxation to occur. State appellate courts, particularly
those staffed by popular election, may well find it easier to
avoid rigorous application of the Chapman standard knowing
that they will not suffer reversal as easily by federal habeas
courts now obliged to apply the Brecht formulation. The Eighth
Circuit has addressed this problem prophylactically by holding
that the Brecht test is not applicable unless the state appellate
court has identified the error and first applied Chapman in its
analysis. 71
The structural problem created by the use of differing stan-
dards of review or burdens of proof in the direct appeal and
post-conviction stages of litigation is that those courts demon-
strating less fidelity to the enforcement of federal constitutional
values are now able to relax enforcement. Those courts most
rigorous in their application of the Chapman harmlessness anal-
ysis are perhaps likely to continue with their pattern of vigor-
ous enforcement. Nonetheless, state appellate judges might
question why their review should be more likely to result in
reversal of state convictions based on violations of the federal
constitution than review conducted by federal courts.
For the Brecht majority, that answer lies in the fundamen-
tal distinction between direct appeal and habeas corpus or other
avenues for collateral attack."' The error-correcting function
of direct appeal simply does not apply to the intended, extraor-
dinary nature of habeas relief--"to afford relief to those whom
application of federal constitutional principles to violations occurring in state proceed-
ings. A numerical majority of the Court rejected the notion that federal habeas courts
should defer to "reasonable" dispositions of federal claims by state appellate courts,
much as subsection (d) of § 2254 generally requires deference to state court findings of
fact. Wright, 505 U.S. at 287.
171. Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 1280, 1292 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom.
Norris v. Starr, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994).
172. 113 S. Ct. at 1721.
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society has 'grievously wronged."'"" 3
Although the majority clearly draws this distinction to
explain the intertwining of the goals of judicial economy, fed-
eralism, and comity, the impact of Brecht will necessarily re-
strict habeas relief even further in the future. Especially if
some state appellate courts tend to relax in their enforcement
of constitutional values, some cases that formerly would have
resulted in relief being granted will ultimately result in denial
of relief. The potential deterrent effect to trial court and pros-
ecution error that flows logically from rigorous enforcement of
constitutional rights will necessarily be diluted by any proce-
dure which insulates less-than-rigorous enforcement on state
direct appeal from the high degree of review which Chapman
formerly required of federal habeas courts.
The Brecht majority responded to the suggestion that the
adoption of the Kotteakos rule would jeopardize enforcement of
federal constitutional rights: "'The role of federal habeas pro-
ceedings, while important in assuring that constitutional rights
are observed, is secondary and limited. Federal courts are not
forums in which to relitigate state trials."" 74 This approach
certainly advances the majority's concern for comity, yet does
so by admitting that federal habeas will not continue to serve
its former role in the enforcement of constitutional rights.
Eventually, one must question whether the reliance on a
state appellate court's enforcement of federal constitutional
rights can be predicated on continued reliance on Chapman's
harmless-error doctrine. State appellate judges might logically
inquire as to why constitutional error should be treated any
differently than non-constitutional error in disposition of crimi-
nal appeals. Absent a showing of unfairness resulting from the
error, reversal is a costly solution to the problem of trial error
which may or may not carry with it the intended deterrent
effect.
Certainly, the Court has already demonstrated that state
173. Id. (citation omitted).
174. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1719 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887
(1983)).
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procedural devices for preservation of error may be applied
equally to constitutional and non-constitutional claims in order
to preclude federal habeas review of unpreserved constitutional
trial error. The next step for the Brecht majority may be recon-
sideration of the Chapman rule itself, as the Court elevates
concerns for federalism, comity, and judicial economy above
costly enforcement of federal rights when a violation has occa-
sioned no significant unfairness in the adjudication process.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the pace of habeas corpus reform in the deci-
sions of the Supreme Court appears to have slowed somewhat
in light of major holdings of prior terms, a slowed pace does
not preclude further refinement of the remedy or a congressio-
nal restructuring of § 2254. First, it is clear that the decision in
Brecht itself will generate additional litigation concerning the
proper disposition of constitutional claims brought by state
inmates. Most interestingly, petitioners might challenge applica-
bility of Brecht to cases already pending in federal habeas
courts as a "new rule" not entitled to retroactive application
under Teague v. Lane,'75 although it appears that the prosecu-
tion is permitted to benefit from new rules of procedure even
when a defendant cannot.
Moreover, the Court will likely confront questions which
arise as a consequence of procedural irregula-ity in the applica-
tion of Chapman on direct review. For example, should a peti-
tioner be able to argue that his claim of error was itself im-
properly adjudicated by a state appellate court erring in its
Chapman analysis? If so, virtually all federal claims would
include an allegation that the state system failed in its appli-
cation of the correct standard of review of the federal constitu-
tional error on direct appeal. Yet, the principle of de novo
175. 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (holding that a habeas corpus petitioner cannot benefit
from a "new rule" of criminal procedure after the conviction has become final). The
Teague Court defined "new rule" as "not dictated by precedent existing at the time
defendant's conviction became final." Id. at 301.
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review, affirmed by a fragmented Court in Wright v. West,176
would suggest that a federal habeas court addresses the merits
of the federal constitutional claim without reference to the state
court's rejection of the claim and the reasons for its affir-
mance. Otherwise, the argument for deference to a state court
law finding, which was advanced by Justice Thomas in his
separate opinion in Wright v. West,' would find support in
the suggestion that the federal habeas court should sit to per-
form appellate review of state court decisionmaking. This is, at
best, a controversial proposition, given the continuing concern
for comity that is evident in the Court's habeas corpus deci-
sions."' The reaffirmation of de novo habeas review of state
court legal determinations,'79 including review of mixed ques-
tions of law and fact which is conducted de novo'8s despite
statutorily required deference to state court fact finding,'
176. 505 U.S. 277, 290-95 (1992).
177. Id. at 285-95. The Thomas position advocating deference to state court law
finding, perhaps paralleling the deference required to state fact finding required by §
2254(d), was joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia.
178. See Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1710 ("Federalism, comity, and the constitutional
obligation of state and federal courts all counsel against any presumption that a deci-
sion of this Court will 'deter' lower federal or state courts from fully performing their
sworn duty."); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983) ("Federal courts are not
forums in which to relitigate state trials.").
179. The decision in Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992), affirmed Brown v. Al-
len, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), in regard to the federal habeas court's tradition of de novo
review of state court determinations of law. That Wright expressly addresses this issue
as a matter of primary importance within the Court is evidenced by the terms of the
order granting certiorari which directed the parties to brief the issue of deferential re-
view of state court legal determinations. See Wright v. West, 502 U.S. 1021, 1021
(1991). The Wright Court requested the parties to argue and brief the following ques-
tion:
In determining whether to grant a petition for a writ of habeas cor-
pus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state
court, should a federal court give deference to the state court's
application of law to the specific facts of the petitioner's case or
should it review the state court's determination de novo?
Id.
180. Mixed questions of fact and law are reviewed by the federal habeas court de
novo. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985).
181. A state court determination of a factual issue "evidenced by a written finding,
written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be
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leads more logically to the conclusion that state appellate court
error in its application of the Chapman harmless-error analysis
is not, in itself, a ground for relief in federal habeas.
Furthermore, the narrow majorities and pluralities which
have characterized a number of the Court's recent criminal
procedural decisions, often rendered in the context of capital
prosecutions, suggest that existing precedent is subject to chal-
lenge. In light of the forceful argument by Justice Scalia in his
concurrence in Payne v. Tennessee,'82 that narrow precedent
of short term duration should be subject to reconsideration,
changes in Court composition might well produce the result
advocated by the Scalia approach. Even if the overruling of re-
cent precedent does not result from changes in the Court's
membership, the prospects for continuing challenge to rulings
that restrict access to federal habeas corpus remain high both
because of the closeness of the Court's decisions and because
of the pressures for extended litigation experienced by counsel
in death penalty cases.
Clearly, the worst fears about the implication of Brecht
have been tempered by the majority opinion in O'Neal, which
revitalized Justice Stevens' limited concurrence in Brecht. The
5-4 split in the subsequent decision effectively modified the
impact of Brecht by expressly disavowing any intent to impose
a "burden of proof' upon the federal habeas petitioner. How-
ever, even O'Neal's moderating impact suggests a duty upon
petitioner's counsel to advance an arguable theory of prejudice
when advancing claims of constitutional trial error by the state
court. This does represent some shift in a policy which had
provided even stronger protection for state inmates asserting
constitutional claims relying on the Chapman standard of re-
view.
Regardless of the future course of habeas litigation, Brecht
serves an important function in restricting federal relief to those
constitutional claims involving rights deprivations truly injurious
to an accused's right to a fair trial. The holding may also sug-
correct." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1977) (emphasis added).
182. 501 U.S. 808, 833 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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gest that the Court will ultimately abandon the Chapman harm-
less-error rule-a principle binding on state court review of
federal constitutional claims-in favor of a rule of prejudice
that resembles the rule now applicable to claims of trial er-
ror.
183
The significance of the Court's use of language in explain-
ing harmlessness analysis is not to be underestimated. The
Chapman formulation was subsequently explained further by
the Court in Sullivan v. Louisiana: 4 "The inquiry, in other
words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error,
a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether
the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely
unattributable to the error."'8 5 Chapman, however, addressed
harmlessness in terms of the "possibility that the evidence com-
plained of might have contributed to the conviction," drawing
this language from the Court's prior decision in Fahy v. Con-
necticut."6 Certainly, the Chapman Court did not view the
problem of harm in a theoretical void. Instead, it looked to the
impact of the constitutional error on the trial, rather than mere-
ly considering the question of reversal in the abstract.8 7
183. The Brecht majority noted that the Kotteakos rule itself derived from 28 U.S.C.
§ 2111: "On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall
give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects
which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1988). The
majority observed that this principle had been applied only to non-constitutional claims
of error in federal proceedings in the past and cited United States v. Lane, 474 U.S.
438 (1986). This reference may suggest that the majority believes Lane will ultimately
be ripe for overruling in favor of the adoption of a single standard for review of all
claims of error in federal cases, suggesting that state courts would then be afforded a
relaxation of the requirement that Chapman harmless-error analysis be applied in re-
viewing claims of federal constitutional error in state proceedings. This approach
would certainly be consistent with the Court's recent concern for comity in the opera-
tion of the federal habeas remedy. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1721.
184. 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993).
185. Id. at 2081 (emphasis added).
186. 375 U.S. 85 (1963) (holding that the exclusionary rule governing illegally
seized evidence applied to cases on direct appeal).
187. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
Although our prior cases have indicated that there are some constitutional
rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as
harmless error, this statement in Fahy itself belies any belief that all trial
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Justice Scalia's assessment of Chapman, however, looks
surprisingly like the Brecht/Kotteakos test in application. His
subtle restatement of the rule in terms of whether the guilty
verdict was "surely attributable" to the error does not reflect
the "possibility" standard to which the Court referred in Fahy
and Chapman. Instead of questioning the likelihood that error
resulted in conviction in light of the other evidence or that it
could have prejudiced the accused in any event in a case of
overwhelming evidence, the Sullivan "restatement" of Chapman,
what must be considered dicta in light of the ultimate disposi-
tion, focuses on whether the error "surely" contributed to the
verdict. 8'
Although ultimately holding that Chapman is inapplicable
to this "structural error" essentially deprives the reviewing court
of any accurate means of determining harm,'89 this character-
ization of Chapman may actually foreshadow an eventual
change in the way a majority of the Court perceives harmless-
ness even in the context of the direct appeal. The Court con-
cluded that the defective jury instruction at issue, which im-
properly expressed the prosecution's burden of proof, could not
be subject to constitutional harmless-error analysis because the
error essentially vitiates all findings made by the jury.90
Eventually, abandonment of Chapman may be seen by yet
another majority of the Court to impose a burden for enforce-
ment of federal constitutional protections on state courts no
greater than that seen by the Brecht Court as reasonable for
errors which violate the Constitution automatically call for reversal. At the
same time, however, like the federal harmless-error statute, it emphasizes
an intention not to treat as harmless those constitutional errors that 'affect
substantial rights' of a party.
Id. at 23 (citing Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (coerced confession); Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510
(1927) (impartial judge)).
188. See Jason S. Marks, Postscript: Harmless Error, Habeas Corpus, and a Con-
stitutional Eclipse, 8 CRIM. JUST. No. 3, 30, 31 (1993) (arguing that Sullivan and
Brecht represent a decisive shift from Chapman's strong statement in support of en-
forcement of federal constitutional rights in state criminal trials)
189. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2083 (1993).
190. Id. at 2082.
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resolution of those trial error claims once they reach the feder-
al habeas process. However, the most recent shift in the com-
position of the Court, evidenced by Justice Breyer's opinion for
the majority in O'Neal, may indicate that Chapman's viability
as an important safeguard of federal constitutional protections
for criminal defendants will not be sacrificed to the Court's
recent preferences for comity, finality, and federalism in the
context of its habeas corpus jurisprudence.

